«EURASIAN INTEGRATION: LEGAL AND EDUCATIONAL ASPECTS Novosibirsk, 3–5 of December 2014 SECOND SCHOOL OF INTERECOLAW Novosibirsk, 4–5 of December ...»
Особенностью территориальных споров в Центральной Азии является то, что они на данном этапе пребывают в латентном состоянии. Однако в случае неблагоприятного развития ситуации в регионе нельзя исключить рецидивов обострения обстановки, грозящей международной безопасности и стабильности. Накопленный огромный опыт применения общепризнанных мирных средств в международном праве и практика применения данного инструментария являются надежным подспорьем при решении территориальных споров в этом регионе.
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ThE PRINCIPLE OF «COMMON BUT DIFFERENTIATED RESPONSIBILITIES»
IN ThE PROTECTION OF GLOBAL CLIMATE
ПРИНЦИП «ОБЩЕЙ, НО ДИФФЕРЕНЦИРОВАННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТИ»
В ОХРАНЕ ГЛОБАЛьНОГО КЛИМАТАЭ. Ребиндер, Почетный профессор (эмеретус) экономического и экологического права Франкфуртского университета им. Иоганна Вольфганга Гёте, доктор юридических наук (Франкфурт-на-Майне, Германия) There is almost common agreement among scientists that global warming to a large degree is caused by human activities, that is, the accumulation of greenhouse gases from industry, agriculture, transport and consumption in the atmosphere and that a major reduction of the emission of such gases is indispensable in order to stabilize global climate. Against the backdrop of a strongly divergent stage of economic and social development in the world, the crucial question is how to allocate the reduction burden among states. In this respect the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) plays a major role. The basic idea underlying this principle is that in attributing responsibilities the different circumstances, in particular the degree of contribution to the environmental problem and the economic and technological capabilities of states, have to be taken into account.
The CBDR principle has been set forth in the Rio Declaration and the Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992 and since then confirmed by the Declaration of the Johannesburg Conference on Sustainable Development of 2002 and Outcome Document of the Rio Conference on Sustainable Development of 2012 (Rio + 20). It is not a principle of customary international law but, rather, a principle contained in conventions and beyond, a soft law principle. Although it is not universally applicable, in any case the CBDR principle is widely recognized as a guide principle in the field of global climate protection.
The CBDR principle has two components: common responsibility and differentiation of this responsibility. All states which contribute to the relevant problem bear some kind of responsibility. However, the respective responsibilities shall be differentiated according to equity criteria. This differentiation may take various forms: asymmetric substantive obligations, adjustment periods, less stringent commitments in terms of ambition or obligatory force. Originally, in global climate protection the CBDR principle has been understood in the sense of a fundamental dichotomy between developed and developing states, whereby only the developed states had to assume specific mitigation and technology transfer obligations, while the developing states could continue and even increase their greenhouse gas emissions without any limitations. However, the rise of emerging economies, especially the BRICS countries, with their increasing greenhouse gas emissions and economic and technological capabilities, accompanied by a mostly insufficient willingness to decouple growth and greenhouse gas emissions, requires a reconsideration of this basic concept of attribution of responsibilities which in fact ignores the idea of common responsibilities inherent in the CBDR principle. There is a need for a certain redefinition of the CBDR principle which does not constitute a «dilution» of the principle but a mere refinement that takes direct recourse to the policy considerations underlying the principle, that is, contribution and capability. However, emerging economies are not expected to bear the same responsibilities as fully developed countries since the right to develop includes the right to development space. What is required, though, is a greater contribution to climate protection from their side.
Принцип «общей, но дифференцированной ответственности» в охране глобального климата 111 The more recent global climate negotiations, especially the various Conferences of the Parties since 2007 which have aimed at paving the way for the conclusion of the new global climate change convention in 2015 and a prolongation of the Kyoto Protocol (which in the meantime has been agreed upon), have been characterized by a visible tendency away from a mere classification as developing country towards substantive criteria that justify differentiation of obligations in applying the CBDR principle. In these discussions, the role of historic responsibility, that is, responsibility of developed countries to the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, has remained a fundamental point of disagreement. It should be noted that the international community has never agreed at all that historic contribution is part of the CBDR principle so that there are various options in this respect. It seems by now accepted that also the developing countries need to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. Besides, a major outcome of the climate negotiations has been that a mere extension of the top-down concept of quantitative reduction obligations imposed by the convention as pursued by the Kyoto Protocol is not internationally acceptable. Rather, while developed states shall in principle follow this top-down approach and in addition provide more financing for mitigation measures to be taken by developing countries, the latter countries only are expected to make voluntary pledges of national mitigation measures, although subject to a common review process (bottom-up approach).
There has been a quite extensive discussion among economists, political scientists and experts on public international law about the distributional implications of the CBDR principle. Most of these discussions are based on top-down quantitative emission reduction but may also be useful to evaluate the new dual approach.
In the review process on the voluntary pledges, it is not only the effectiveness of the respective pledges, but also their equity and fairness in comparison with the commitment of developed counties and pledges of other developing countries that will be reviewed and discussed. The distributional issue will reappear through the backdoor. In the academic discussion, allocation models based on a single criterion, especially historic responsibility, population (underlying idea: ultimately equal per capita allocation) and the «carbon footprint» of consumption have been presented. All these criteria have their pros and cons but appear somewhat unilateral.
Allocation models that are based on a combination of criteria such as historic and present emissions, economic and technological capability, vulnerability, need for future development and population are more balanced.
However, the crucial issue of specifying the criteria and weighting with regard to other criteria seems to raise insurmountable obstacles. Agreement on the relevance of certain factors does not necessarily lead to agreement on any allocation scheme.
Ultimately, the relevant attribution criteria will only serve as arguments in an international negotiation process which essentially is of a political nature. While the change of basic realities is mirrored by a willingness in principle of states to accept a certain redefinition of the CBDR principle, the exact distribution of the economic burdens of global climate protection remains highly controversial. Under these circumstances, the idea of self-interest through double dividends may gain a greater weight. Where there is a need to reduce extreme outdoor pollution and illegal transboundary dispersal of air pollutants, action on conventional air pollution will also reduce couple greenhouse gas emissions and preserve the function of forests as sinks for carbon dioxide. Moreover, climate change policy may afford chances for technological innovation. Even a country located in a cold climate zone which theoretically may profit from warmer temperatures may want to take mitigation measures because the risks associated with the melting of perm-frost areas are impossible to predict and control.
SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS IN CROSS-BORDER PIPELINE PROJECTS:
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SUSTAINABLE MITIGATIONDamilola S. Olawuyi, Director of the Institute for Oil, Gas, Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development (OGEES), LL.B (1st Class), BL (1st Class), LL.M (Calgary), LL.M (Harvard), Ph.D (Oxford)
СОЦИАЛьНыЕ И ЭКОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ РИСКИ ПРОЕКТОВ ТРАНСГРАНИЧНыХ
ТРУБОПРОВОДОВ: ПРАВОВыЕ ОСНОВы УСТОЙЧИВОГО СНИЖЕНИЯ
НЕГАТИВНОГО ВОЗДЕЙСТВИЯ НА ОКРУЖАЮЩУЮ СРЕДУДамилола С. Олавуйи, директор Института нефти, газа, энергетики, окружающей среды и устойчивого развития (OGEES), доктор права (1-го класса), бакалавр права (1-го класса), магистр права (Калгари), магистр права (Гарвард), доктор юридических наук (Оксфорд) (Адо-Экити, Нигерия) (Калгари, Канада) Increased demand for oil and natural gas across borders has led to a geometric rise in the construction of cross-border pipelines and infrastructure that could aid the transportation of oil and gas resources from a resourced based country to a country in demand. Examples include the West African Gas Pipeline project, the Ukranian Gastransiit gas pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline, the Keystone XL pipeline project from Canada to United States and the proposed Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline project. These large-scale projects offer many positive economic benefits to the respective countries involved and could facilitate trans-border trade, economic development, job creation and the integration of national economies.
However, there are equally several social, environmental and health risks associated with large and complex cross-border oil and gas pipeline projects raise human rights questions. These include: the mass displacement of citizens from traditionally inhabited lands and proposed investment sites; lack of stakeholder engagement and consultation in project planning and implementation; siting and concentration of projects in poor and vulnerable communities; insomnia and loss of sleep due to increased noise and activity level from construction sites; lack of governmental accountability on projects and the absence of review and complaint mechanisms for victims to obtain redress for these problems. These human rights impacts of cross-border oil and gas pipeline infrastructure constrain the development of cross-border infrastructure projects and therefore require legal and policy framework to mitigate them.