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«Item 7b Severe Accidents Related Issues Preliminary Monitoring Report Report to the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water ...»

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1.2.4 Have the existing emergency response procedures been reviewed to address changes relating to SAM State-of-the-art requirements and practices The organisation of emergency response should be clearly described in the ERP of the operating organisation. The related state-of-the-art requirements are defined in the IAEA safety standards [IAEA 2000 a, IAEA 02]. A brief overview of requirements regarding ERP is provided below.

The ERP should describe the on-site organisation used to perform the emergency response (ER) functions and conditions under which an emergency should be declared, including the criteria for classifying the event, a list of job titles and/or functions of persons empowered to declare it, and a description of suitable arrangements for alerting response personnel and public authorities. Arrangements for minimising the exposure of persons on and off the site to ionizing radiation, and for ensuring medical treatment of casualties should be described.

The plan should define the chain of command and communication as well as the related facilities and procedures. Inventory of the emergency equipment to be kept in readiness at specified locations and actions to be taken by persons and organisations involved in the implementation of the plan for each class of emergency should be described. Arrangements for declaring the termination of an emergency should also be included.

The operator and ER organisations should identify the knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary to be able to perform the emergency functions. The operator and the response organisations should make arrangements for selection of personnel and training to ensure that the personnel have the requisite knowledge, skills, abilities, equipment, and procedures to perform their assigned emergency response functions.

Current plant status The onsite emergency plan has been revised and submitted for review by SUJB to account for changes arising from implementation of the SAMGs. There was only minor discussion of the E-Plan/SAMG interface during the Prague workshop. [Dessars 03, Miasnikov 03, Sỷkora 03 b]. The activation of Technical Support Centre upon entry into the EOPs and SAMGs was discussesd, along with definition of responsibilities and authorities for using SAMGs, and the transfer of information to off-site authorities. These aspects are considered as an integral part of the SAMG implementation process. It is understood that the existing ER implementing procedures will be reviewed in due time to address changes relating to the implementation of plant specific SAMGs.

Evaluation It can be concluded that relevant AM related interfaces with the plant specific E-plan are identified and taken into consideration in the development of SAMGs. Plant arrangements and activities in this area are consistent with the current stage of the SAMG implementation process. There is no reason not to expect that the on-site emergency response infrastructure (MCR, TSC, Operation Support, etc.) will be properly addressed with regard to their role, and ETE Road Map - Preliminary Monitoring Report – Item 7b: Severe Accidents Related Issues 37 that the related interfaces will be specified in the plant procedures (administrative procedures, EIPs, EOPs, SAMGs, etc.) and the overall Emergency Response Plan (on-site and off-site).

Confirmation of this could be a subject for further monitoring, or could be handled within the area of emergency response organisation (interface between Austria and the Czech Republic).

2.3 Organisation and Responsibilities in SAM

VLI No. VLI title / description 1.3.1 Is there a clear division of preventive actions (EOPs) and mitigation actions (SAMGs) and associated responsibilities?

1.3.2 Have the personnel needed/involved in AM been specified?

1.3.3 Are the lines of responsibility and authority for all the personnel involved in AM clearly defined?

1.3.4 What are the criteria for transition of responsibilities for AM from the MCR to on-site emergency response centre (TSC)?

1.3.5 Are the available human resources at the plant sufficient for SAM?

1.3.6 Has an adequate call-on system for personnel involved in SAM been established?

State-of-the-art requirements and practices Typically, the implementation of AM during an accident is based on a clear division of preventive AM actions (covered by EOPs) and mitigation AM actions (covered by SAMGs). As a general rule the main control room (MCR) staff and the Shift Supervisor are responsible for implementation of mitigation actions (within the EOPs) and the TSC staff is responsible for the use of SAMGs. In the domain of EOPs, the MCR would request support from the TSC where it is considered useful. In SAMG domain, all decisions are made in the TSC, where the only formal role of the MCR is the execution of strategies decided upon in the TSC.

The criteria for transition of AM from EOPs to SAMGs should be clearly defined in the plant procedures (EOPs). Typically, there are 3 specific EOPs from which such a transition can take place. In WOG plants these are ‘Response to Inadequate Core Cooling’ (FR-C.1), ‘Loss of All AC Power’ (ECA-0.0), and ‘Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS’ (FR-S.1) [WOG 01].

The lines of responsibility and authority for all personnel involved in AM (MCR and TSC staff as well as of other staff of the emergency response organisations), need to be specified in the plant procedures. One of the important SAMG implementation issues is the authorisation of intentional discharge of radioactivity from the containment and associated responsibilities.





This authorisation should be clearly defined in the overall Emergency Response Plan (ERP).

Typically, the main responsibility for overall SAMG evaluation and implementation is assigned to TSC Director (On-site Emergency Director). The TSC Director is supported by the SAMG decision-making support group (DMSG), which co-ordinates and monitors the implementation of the selected SAMG strategies and assesses their effectiveness.

The TSC DMSG group should include a/o the TSC technical support coordinator, radiation protection coordinator, TSC operations coordinator, engineering coordinator, maintenance coordinator, and TSC information coordinator. The TSC technical support coordinator provides supervision to the SAMG evaluation group (EG), which is responsible for the evaluation of plant conditions and SA challenges and for the determination of SAM strategies using SAMGs.

TSC support should also include staff responsible for TSC communication, data transfer, computer operation, and core physics support coordination. The TSC is required to be functional within certain time period following an emergency event (in accordance to emergency criteria stated in the ERP). Typically, this should be not be delayed more than 1 hour.

38 ETE Road Map - Preliminary Monitoring Report – Item 7b: Severe Accidents Related Issues Current plant status The dividing line between EOPs (preventive actions) and SAMGs (mitigative actions) has been clarified. The division of responsbilities and decision-making authority between the TSC and the MCR has also been clarified. With regard to the authority and responsibilities, focus was put in the workshop presentations on lower level of decision-making (MCR and TSC).

Not much has been said relating to the authority/responsibility assigned to higher level staff/positions. It seems that the plant's intentions for taking a decision on an intentional release of radioactivity to the environment (as during filtered venting) is are not consistently clear within the organisation. One senior official stated flatly that this would not be done, however the SAMGs clearly envision it being done. In response to a direct question relating to this issue the Temelín experts answered that on-going strategy will be discussed with local authorities but that there is no written requirements / obligations [Sykora 03 a].

Transition of responsibilities for AM from the MCR to on-site emergency response centre (TSC) is well defined [Dessars 03]. Basic criteria for the transition from the EOPs to SAMGs are defined (‘core exit temperature 650oC and all recovery actions have failed’). These criteria are consistent with the WOG SAMG generic concept [WOG 01]. At the moment, the current revision of EOPs at the plant does not comply with these transition criteria because Temelín SAMGs are under internal review and approval. Target for full implementation of SAMGs is the end of 2004.

Evaluation Transition of AM actions from the EOPs to SAMGs and related responsibilities are well defined with no concurrent use of both packages. Basic criteria for the transition are consistent with the WOG generic concept.

Dedicated human resources for the implementation of SAMGs during an accident are defined. However, the current staffing level of the SAMG evaluation group appears to be rather small (see Section 2.4).

It seems that the intention, within a SAMG strategy, of an intentional release of radioactivity from the containment (as during venting to prevent severe containment challenge) is not clearly defined and understood within the plant organisation. This issue should be resolved when finalizing the ERP and respective plant procedures.

Future actions by the operator/regulator, which are recommended on the technical level to be monitored jointly in the framework of the pertinent bilateral Agreement between Austria and

the Czech Republic:

• The plans of the Temelín plant to implement filtered venting as part of SCG-1 should be clarified. Our understanding is that this is a planned measure for implementation as needed (Severe Challenge Guideline SCG-2, “Depressurize Containment”). Confirmation of this could be a subject for further monitoring.

ETE Road Map - Preliminary Monitoring Report – Item 7b: Severe Accidents Related Issues 39

2.4 Organisational Changes at the Plant Relating to SAMP Implementation

VLI No. VLI title / description 1.4.1 What organisational changes have been made in relation to SAM? Are there any organizational changes other than establishing the SAMG Evaluation Group?

1.4.2 What is the staffing and qualifications of the SAMG Evaluation Group within the TSC?

1.4.3 Have any administrative arrangements been made for the provision of required information to the SAMG Evaluation Group during a severe accident?

1.4.4 Have any additional communication lines needed for the execution of SAMGs during a severe accident been established?

State-of-the-art requirements and practices Additions to plant’s emergency plan and related procedures (as discussed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3) have to be made in relation to SAMG implementation. It should be noted that these modifications are usually not numerous, since the emergency organisation is almost the same in the case of a DBA and in a SA. Most of these changes are implemented based on the existing organisational framework.

Establishing the SAMG Evaluation Group (EG) is not a new process, but is rather evolution of the organisational process which is in place at the plant in relation to DBA conditions.

SAMG EG should include adequate number of qualified staff. SAMG EG staff, in particular the decision maker, should have qualifications and experience in control room operation (see Section 3.6.

5).

Current plant status Relevant changes in the existing administrative framework for emergency response are being introduced. The updated ERP and SAMG package are under review and approval. Following their approval the respective emergency implementing procedures will also be updated. The existing EOPs will also be revised to introduce proper instructions for the transition to SAMGs.

To provide appropriate support for the implementation of SAMGs during a severe accident the SAMG Evaluation Group has been established within the existing structure of the TSC. It should be noted that the TSC was established earlier as an integral part of the implementation of symptom based EOPs.

In accordance with the current organisation of the TSC at Temelín NPP [Sỷkora 03 a], the team responsible for the evaluation of SAMGs during a SA (SAMG EG) includes 4 persons, namely: the Shift Supervisor, Safety Engineer, Operational Support Engineer, and Intervention Control Engineer (it has been pointed out that the latter one is the person who has very good expertise in line-up of equipment and will be capable to advise on non- conventional line-up). They are supported by Radiation Protection, Radiochemistry Support and Information Systems specialists.

Evaluation Changes in the administrative framework including ERP, EOPs, and administrative procedures related to SAMGs are specified and their implementation ongoing. The current status is consistent with the actual stage of the SAM implementation process. Some concerns related to the staffing of SAMG EG are discussed below.

Based on practices adopted in other plants, the SAMG evaluation group should include 3-4 persons who are responsible for the evaluation of plant conditions and SA challenges and for 40 ETE Road Map - Preliminary Monitoring Report – Item 7b: Severe Accidents Related Issues the determination of SAM strategies using SAMGs. This group should be dedicated to SAMG evaluation and not have any other responsibilities. The Operational Support Engineer and Intervention Control Engineer (or their equivalents) are part of the TSC anyway. During a SA they may have other duties and might not be able to fully concentrate on the evaluation of strategies using SAMGs.

Future actions by the operator/regulator, which are recommended on the technical level to be monitored jointly in the framework of the pertinent bilateral Agreement between Austria and

the Czech Republic:

• The Specialist’s Team would also recommend the Austrian Governement the consideration to verify in due time that observations from the SAMG validation process on the performance of SAMG EG staff and conclusions regarding the adequacy of staffing and organisation of this group within the TSC are properly collected and, if needed, appropriate organisational changes made.

ETE Road Map - Preliminary Monitoring Report – Item 7b: Severe Accidents Related Issues 41

3 TEMELÍN SAM PROGRAMME EVALUATION



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